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Women and men may di¤er in their propensity to choose a risky outcome because of innate pref-
erences or because pressure to conform to gender-stereotypes encourages girls and boys to modify
their innate preferences. Single-sex environments are likely to modify studentsrisk-taking prefer-
ences in economically important ways. To test this, we designed a controlled experiment in which
subjects were given an opportunity to choose a risky outcome - a real-stakes gamble with a higher
expected monetary value than the alternative outcome with a certain payo¤ - and in which the
sensitivity of observed risk choices to environmental factors could be explored. The results of our
real-stakes gamble show that gender di¤erences in preferences for risk-taking are indeed sensitive
to whether the girl attends a single-sex or coed school. Girls from single-sex schools are as likely to
choose the real-stakes gamble as boys from either coed or single sex schools, and more likely than
coed girls. Moreover, we found that gender di¤erences in preferences for risk-taking are sensitive
to the gender mix of the experimental group, with girls being more likely to choose risky outcomes
when assigned to all-girl groups. This suggests that observed gender di¤erences in behaviour un-
der uncertainty found in previous studies might reect social learning rather than inherent gender
traits.
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I. Introduction
It is well-known that women are under-represented in high-paying jobs and in high-
level occupations. Recent work in experimental economics has examined to what degree
this under-representation may be due to innate di¤erences between men and women. For
example, gender di¤erences in risk aversion, feedback preferences or fondness for competition
may help explain some of the observed gender disparities. If the majority of remuneration
in high-paying jobs is tied to bonuses based on a companys performance, then, if men are
less risk averse than women, women may choose not to take high-paying jobs because of the
uncertainty. Di¤erences in risk attitudes may even a¤ect individual choices about seeking
performance feedback or entering a competitive environment.
Understanding whether and to what extent risk attitudes are innate or shaped by ones en-
vironment is important for policy. If risk attitudes are innate then the under-representation
of women in high-paying jobs may only be solved by changing the way in which renumera-
trion is rewarded. However, if risk attitudes are primary shaped by ones environment than
changing the context in which one is educated, or trained in sports could help address the
under-representation. Thus the policy perscription for dealing with under-representation of
women in high-paying jobs will depend upon if the reason for the absence is innate to ones
gender.
Why women and men might have di¤erent preferences or risk attitudes has been discussed
but not tested by economists. Broadly speaking, those di¤erences may be due to either
nurture, nature or some combination of the two. For example, boys are pushed to take risks
when participating in competitive sports and girls are often encouraged to remain cautious.
Thus, the riskier choices made by males could be due to the nurturing received from parents
or peers. Likewise the disinclination of women to take risks could be the result of parental
or peer pressure not to do so.
With the exception of Gneezy, Leonard and List (2008) and Gneezy and Rustichini (2004),
the experimental literature on competitive behaviour has been conducted with college-age
men and women attending coeducational universities. And yet the education literature shows
that the academic achievement of girls and boys responds di¤erentially to coeducation, with
boys typically performing better and girls worse than in single-sex environments (Kessler
et al., 1985; Brutsaert, 1999). Moreover, psychologists argue that the gendered aspect of
individualsbehaviour is brought into play by the gender of others with whom they interact
(Maccoby, 1998, and references therein.) In this paper we sample a di¤erent subject pool
to that normally used in the literature to investigate the role that nurturing might play in
shaping one particularly important facet underlying competitive behaviour risk attitudes.
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We use students from years 10 and 11 who are attending either single-sex or coeducational
schools. We will examine the e¤ect of three potential types of nuturing on risk attitudes
educational environment, household characteristics, and randomly assigned experimental
peer-groups. The rst two represent longer-run nurturing experiences, while the last the
experimental group captures short-run environmental e¤ects. Finally, we will compare the
results of our experiment with survey information stated attitudes to risk obtained from a
post-experiment questionnaire to examine if reported and observed levels of risk aversion
di¤er.
A number of studies have looked at parental inuences and intergenerational transmission
of risk attitudes (see Dohmen et al., 2006, and references therein) and an important paper by
Gneezy, Leonard and List (2008) explores the role that culture plays in determining gender
di¤erences in competitive behaviour. Gneezy et al. investigate two distinct societies the
Maasai tribe of Tanzania and the Khasi tribe in India. The former are patriarchal while the
latter are matrilineal. They nd that, in the patriarchal society, women are less competitive
than men, which is consistent with experimental data from Western cultures. But in the
matrilineal society, women are more competitive than men. Indeed, the Khasi women were
found to be as competitive as Maasai men.1 The authors interpret this as evidence that
culture has an inuence.2 We too use a controlled experiment to see if there are gender
di¤erences in the behaviour of subjects from two distinct environments or cultures.But
our environments  publicly-funded single-sex and coeducational schools  are closer to
one another than those in Gneezy et al (2008) and it seems unlikely that there is much
evolutionary distance between subjects from our two separate environments.3 Any observed
gender di¤erences in behaviour across these two distinct environments is unlikely to be due
to nature but more likely to be due to the nurturing received from parents, teachers or peers,
or to some combination of these three.
Women are observed to be on average more risk averse than men, according to the studies
summarized in Eckel and Grossman (2002).4 This could be through inherited attributes or
1.The experimental task was to toss a tennis ball into a bucket that was placed 3 metres away. A
successful shot meant that the tennis ball entered the bucket and stayed there.
2. Interestingly the authors nd no evidence that, on average, there are gender di¤erences in risk attitudes
within either society.
3.We use subjects from two adjacent counties in south-east England, Essex and Su¤olk. One would be
hard-pressed to argue that Essex girls and boys evolved di¤erently from Su¤olk girls and boys, popular jokes
about "Essex man" notwithstanding. Gneezy et al. (2008) note: "Evolutionary psychologists maintain that
the human mind was formed by one million years of common evolution that ended only 12,000 years ago,
and it is therefore impossible that systematic psychological di¤erences across populations of humans can be
caused by evolution (Daly and Wilson, 2003, Campbell, 2002)."
4.However some experimental studies nd the reverse. For example, Schubert et al. (1999) using as
subjects undergraduates from the University of Zurich, show that the context makes a di¤erence. While
women do not generally make less risky nancial choices than men, they are less likely to engage in an
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nurture. The available empirical evidence suggests that parental attributes shape these risk
attitudes. For instance Dohmen et al. (2006) nd, using the German Socioeconomic Panel,
that individuals with highly educated parents are signicantly more likely to choose risky
outcomes. When looking at the role of peer groups on individuals, we potentially face an
endogeneity issue. If individuals choose the peer groups with whom they associate, they might
sort themselves into groups with similar or opposite characteristics. That is, individuals
might positively or negatively assortatively match on risk attitudes. Peer-group endogeneity
would seem particularly likely if the group under consideration comprised friends. But
fortunately, we have available information on peer groups that is exogenous to the individual:
attendance at publicly-funded single-sex or coeducational schools. If girls are on average
more risk averse than boys, as empirical evidence suggests, will girls who are surrounded by
risk-averse individuals (girls) at school behave in a more risk averse way than girls who are
surrounded by less risk averse individuals (boys)? That is, will girls from single-sex schools
exhibit less risk aversion than girls from coeducational schools?
The characteristics of a childs household such as the number of siblings, gender make-
up of siblings, or parental education are also likely to be exogenous to the child. Thus in
looking at how the proppensity to make risky choices varies with household characteristics,
we are able to see how a students home environment may inuence risk attitudes. If a
girl grows up with sisters, will she be any less risk averse than a girl who grows up with
brothers? The work of Dohmen et al. (2006) would suggest that, at the least, parental
education should relate to childrens risk aversion.
Our third potential nuturing environment is the randomly assigned experimental peer-
group. On arriving at the experiment, students were randomly assigned to three di¤erent
groups: all-girls; all-boys; or mixed gender. Just as educational and household environments
may a¤ect individual subjectschoices, so too might the experimental peer-group. Girls in
an all-girl group may feel more comfortable taking a risk for instance. Given that the
peer-group was randomly assigned, there are no issues of endogeneity. We will test if
the experimental environment has a separate inuence on girlsand boysbehaviour under
uncertainty. We are particularly interested in seeing if girls and boys who are placed in a
same-sex group for the experiment behave di¤erently to girls and boys placed in a mixed
group. While this has been explored in previous work by Gneezy et. al. (2003), Niederle
and Yestrumskas (2007) and Datta Gupta et. al. (2005), those studies all use students from
coeducational environments and the studies did not look at the e¤ect on risk attitudes.
Our nal goal is to use the controlled experiment to see if commonly asked survey ques-
tions about risk yield the same conclusions about gender and risk-aversion to those based
abstract gamble.
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on an experiment. During the experiment, our subjects can choose to make risky choices
with real money at stake. At the end of the experiment, they answer questions about their
risk-attitudes as well as respond to a hypothetical lottery question.5 We are therefore able
to compare actual behaviour with stated attitudes. This allows us to investigate (i) if girls
and boys behave di¤erently when there is actual money at stake; (ii) if girls and boys di¤er
signicantly in their stated attitudes to risk;6 (iii) if there are signicant gender di¤erences
in the distance between actual choices made under uncertainty and stated behaviour under
uncertainty; and (iv) if the general risk question is su¢ cient to describe actual risk-taking
behaviour. In so doing, we explore the degree to which observed gender di¤erences in choices
under uncertainty and stated risk attitudes vary across subjects who have been exposed to
single-sex or coeducational schooling. Furthermore we are able to provide a comparison of
results from a controlled experiment to commonly asked survey questions.
II. Hypotheses
Women and men may di¤er in their propensity to choose a risky outcome because of
innate preferences or because pressure to conform to gender-stereotypes encourages girls and
boys to modify their innate preferences. Our prior is that single-sex environments are likely
to modify studentsrisk-taking preferences in ways that are economically important. To test
this, we designed a controlled experiment in which subjects were given an opportunity to
choose a risky outcome a real-stakes gamble with a higher expected monetary value than
the alternative outcome with a certain payo¤ and in which the sensitivity of observed risk
choices to environmental factors could be explored. Suppose there are preference di¤erences
between men and women. Then, using the data generated by our experiment to estimate
the probability of choosing the real-stakes gamble, we should nd that the female dummy
variable is statistically signicant. Furthermore, if any gender di¤erence is due primarily to
nature, the inclusion of variables that proxy the students"socialization" should not greatly
a¤ect the size or signicance of the estimated coe¢ cient to the female dummy variable.
However, if proxies for "socialization" are found to be statistically signicant, this would
provide some evidence that nurturing plays a role.
Our hypotheses can be summarised as follows.
Conjecture 1. Women are more risk averse than men.
As summarized in Eckel and Grossman (2002) most experimental studies have found that
5.They are also asked questions about their family background, to be discussed later.
6. For instance, boys might state they are more risk-loving as a form of bragging.
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women are more risk averse than men. A sizable number of the studies used elementary and
high school aged children from coed schools (for example see Biring (1995) and Harbaugh,
Krase and Versterlund (2002)). Since our subject pool varies from this standard young
adult sample in that it involves students from both single-sex and coed schools we will rst
examine wether there is a gender di¤erence in risk aversion. We expect to nd that there
is a gender gap in risk attitudes we expect that women in our sample will be more risk
averse than men.
Conjecture 2. Girls from single-sex schools are less risk averse than girls from coed
schools.
Studies show that there may be more pressure for girls to maintain their gender identity
in schools where boys are present than for boys when girls are present (Maccoby, 1990;
Brutsaert, 1999). In a coeducational environment, girls are more explicitly confronted with
adolescent subculture (such as personal attractiveness to members of the opposite sex) than
they are in a single-sex environment (Coleman, 1961). This may lead them to conform to
boysexpectations of how girls should behave to avoid social rejection (American Association
of University Women, 1992). If risk avoidance is viewed as being a part of female gender
identity while risk-seeking is a part of male gender identity, then being in a coeducational
school environment might lead girls to make safer choices than boys.
How might this actually work? It is helpful to extend the identity approach of Akerlof
and Kranton (2000) to this context. Adolescent girls in a coed environment could be subject
to more conict in their gender identity, since they have to compete with boys academically
while at the same time they may feel pressured to develop their femininity in order to be
attractive to boys. Moreover, there may be an externality at work, since girls are competing
with other girls to be popular with boys. This externality may reinforce their need to adhere
to their female gender identity. Why would not boys feel similarly pressured? First, academic
success, assertive behaviour and being attractive to girls are not such contradictory goals,
owing to the prevalence of the male bread-winner model in our society. While adolescent
boys in a coed environment are likely to be very aware of their gender identity, they may
experience di¤erent conicts to those of the girls. To the extent that the presence of girls
pressures boys to develop their masculinity to increase their popularity or to reduce any
threat to their male identity this might make them more assertive and risk-taking. The fact
that they are also competing with other boys for popularity might reinforce this tendency.
If this is true, we would expect girls in coed schools to be less likely than girls in single-sex
schools to take risks. One might also expect coed schoolboys to be more likely to take risks
than single-sex schoolboys, although the education literature suggests that there is greater
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pressure for girls to maintain their gender identity in schools where boys are present than
for boys when girls are present (Maccoby, 1990, 1998).7
Conjecture 3. Girls in same-gender groups are less risk averse than girls in coed groups.
Psychologists have shown that the framing of tasks and cultural stereotypes does a¤ect
the performance of individuals (see inter alia Steele, Spencer, and Aronson, 2002). Being in a
single-sex group for the experiment might have the same e¤ect on girls as being in educated
in a single-sex school. For example, a girl assigned to mixed-sex groups may feel their
gender identity is threatened when they are confronted with boys. This might lead them
to a¢ rm their femininity by conforming to perceived male expectations of girlsbehaviour,
leading them to make less risky choices if they perceive risk-avoidance as being a feminine
trait. Should the same girl be assigned instead to an all-girl group, such reactions would not
be triggered. If girls do feel more pressured to maintain their gender identity when boys are
present than boys feel when girls are present, then we should expect to observe a gender gap
in risk-taking for girls and boys attending single-sex schools who are assigned to mixed-sex
groups.
Conjecture 4. Girls in same-gender environments (single-sex schooling or same-gender
experimental groups) are no less risk averse than boys.
The pychological and education literature cited above suggests that girls, rather than
boys, are likely respond to the same-gender environments. The question is: how much will
girls change? Given that we hypothesize that girls will be less risk averse because of same-
gender environments we conjecture that girlsrisk attitudes in single-sex environments will
be the same as their male counterparts. If this is the case it would suggest that the gender
di¤erences in observed risk attitudes is due to ones environment and not innate di¤erences.
Conjecture 5. Gender di¤erences in risk aversion are sensitive to the way the preferences
are elicited.
To test this, we will compare the results from the choice of whether or not to engage
in a real-stakes gamble with responses obtained from two post-experiment survey questions.
The rst survey question is on general risk attitudes while the second asks how much the
respondent would invest in a risky asset using hypothetical lottery-winnings. (Both questions
will be given in full in the next section.) Moreover, abstract real-stakes gambles might
7.There is also evidence that in coed classrooms boys get more attention and dominate activities (Sadker
et al, 1991; Brutsaert, 1999)
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generate di¤erent gender gaps in risky choices than context-specic hypothetical gambles
(Schubert, Brown, Gysler and Brachinger, 1999).
In particular, we will examine how much, if at all, the answers about general risk atti-
tudes or the hypothetical lottery explain observed choices made in the real-stakes experi-
mental gamble. This will allow us to examine how close stated risk attitudes are to observed
behaviour and to see if girls and boys di¤er on any "gap" that may exist. For example,
suppose that boys state that they are more risk-seeking than they are in actuality, perhaps
because being risk-loving is associated with a notion of "hegemonic masculinity" govern-
ing male gender identity (Kessler, Ashenden, Connell and Dowsett, 1985). If so, then boys
might overstate their willingness to take risks when responding to a gender-attitudes survey
question after all, no real outcome depends on it but be more likely to express their true
risk aversion when confronted with a real-stakes gamble. In contrast, if being risk-loving is
not part of female identity, there should be less distance in outcomes for girls.
III. Experimental Design
Our experiment was designed to test the four conjectures listed above. To examine
the role of nurturing, we recruited students from coeducational and single-sex schools to be
subjects. We also designed an exitsurvey to elicit information about family background
characteristics. At no stage were the schools we selected, or the subjects who volunteered,
told why they were chosen. Our subject pool is relatively large for a controlled, laboratory-
type experiment. We wished to have a large number of subjects from a variety of educational
backgrounds in order to be able to investigate the conjectures outlined above.
Below we rst discuss the educational environment from which our subjects were drawn,
and then the experiment itself.
III.A. Subjects and Educational Environment
In September 2007, students from eight publicly-funded schools in the counties of Essex
and Su¤olk in the UK were bused to the Colchester campus of the University of Essex to
participate in the experiment. Four of the schools were single-sex.8 The students were from
years 10 or 11, and their average age was just under 15 years. On arrival, students from each
8.A pilot was conducted several months earlier, in June at the end of the previous school year. The
point of the pilot was to determine the appropriate level of di¢ culty and duration of the actual experiment.
The pilot used a di¤erent subject pool to that used in the real experiment. It comprised students from
two schools (one single-sex in Essex and one coeducational in Su¤olk) who had recently completed year 11.
The actual experiment conducted some months later, at the start of the new school year, used, as subjects,
students who had just started years 10 or 11.
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school were randomly assigned into 65 groups of four. Groups were of three types: all-girls;
all-boys; or mixed. Mixed groups had at least one student of each gender and the modal
group comprised two boys and two girls. The composition of each group - the appropriate
mix of single-sex schools, coeducational schools and gender - was determined beforehand.
Thus only the assignment of the 260 girls and boys from a particular school to a group
was random. The school mix was two coeducational schools from Su¤olk (103 students), two
coeducational schools from Essex (45 students), two all-girl schools from Essex (66 students),
and two all-boy schools from Essex (46 students).
In Su¤olk county there are no single-sex publicly-funded schools. In Essex county the old
grammarschools remain, owing to a quirk of political history.9 These grammar schools are
single-sex and, like the coeducational schools, are publicly funded. It is highly unlikely that
students themselves actively choose to go to the single-sex schools. Instead Essex primary-
school teachers, with parental consent, choose the more able children to sit for the Essex-wide
exam for entry into grammar schools.10 Parents must be resident in Essex for their children
to be eligible to sit the entrance exam (the 11+ exam). A student must attain above a
certain score (the score will vary from year to year) to attend one of the schools. Therefore
students at the single-sex schools are not a random subset of the students in Essex, since
they are selected based on measurable ability at age 11. If ability is correlated with ones
risk attitudes we may have a problem when identifying the e¤ect of single-sex education.
To examine this we will compare the sample of single-sex students to di¤erent subgroups of
our sample and use two econometric techniques instrumental variables and propesity score
matching to examine any possible bias that may exist. However, unlike schooling, the
gender composition of the experimental peer-group is randomly assigned and therefore the
identication is not in doubt. At the time the "ver" lottery described below the student
will have been in her group for only 30 minutes, much less than the average four-years of
attendance at a single-sex or coed school, so any e¤ect of from the peer-group may also allow
us examine the reliability of the estimated schooling e¤ect.
9. In the UK, schools are controlled by local area authorities but frequently directedby central gov-
ernment. Following the 1944 Education Act, grammar schools became part of the central governments
tripatrtite system of grammar, secondary modern and technical schools (the latter never got o¤ the ground).
By the mid-1960s, the central Labour government put pressure on local authorities to establish comprehen-
siveschools in their place. Across England and Wales, grammar schools survived in some areas (typically
those with long-standing Conservative boroughs) but were abolished in most others. In some counties the
grammar schools left the state system altogether and became independent schools; these are not part of our
study. However, in parts of Essex, single-sex grammar schools survive as publicly-funded entities, while in
Su¤olk they no longer exist.
10. If a student achieves a high enough score on the exam, s/he can attend one of the 12 schools in
the Consortium of Selective Schools in Essex (CSSE). The vast majority of these are single-sex. The four
single-sex schools in our experiment are part of the CSSE.
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The experiment took place in a very large auditorium with 1,000 seats arranged in tiers.
Students in the same group were seated in the same row with an empty seat between each
person. There was also an empty row in front of and behind each group. While subjects
were told which other students were in the same group, they were sitting far enough apart
for their work to be private information. If two students from the same school were assigned
to a group, they were forced to sit as far apart as possible; for example, in a group of four,
two other students would sit between the students from the same school. There was one
supervisor, a graduate student, assigned to supervise every ve groups. Once the experiment
began, students were told not to talk. Each supervisor enforced this rule and also answered
individual questions. Consequently, during the experiment there was very little talking
within or between groups.
III.B. Experiment
Five rounds were conducted during the experiment. In Appendix A we give full details of
all rounds, and there we also describe payments and incentives, which varied from round to
round.11 In the present paper we focus on the results from the round involving the real-stakes
gamble or "ver" lottery. After the experiment ended, students lled out a post-experimental
questionaire that had questions on risk attitudes, family background, and that also included
a hypothetical investment decision using the proceeds from winning a lottery. (Results from
the rst four rounds, designed to elicit di¤erences in competitive behaviour under piece rates
and tournaments, are reported in Booth and Nolen (2008).)
A description of the real stakes gamble (called the "Fiver" Lottery) and the two main
survey questions are discussed below.
"Fiver" Lottery. Each student chooses Option One or Option Two. Option One is to get
£ 5 for sure. Option Two is to ip a coin and get £ 11 if the coin comes up heads or
get £ 2 if the coin comes up tails.
Survey Question: General Risk. Each student was asked: How do you see yourself:
Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid
taking risks? The students then ranked themselves on a scale from 0 to 10 with 0
being labelled risk averseand 10 as fully prepared to take risks.
Survey Question: Hypothetical Lottery. Each student was asked to consider what they
would do in the following situation: Imagine that you have won £ 100,000 in the lottery.
11.After completing all ve rounds a number 1-5 was randomly choosen and students were paid according
to the rules of that round.
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Almost immediately after you collect the winnings, you recieve the following nancial
o¤er from a reputable bank, the conditions of which are as follows: (i) there is a the
chance to double your the money within two years; (ii) it is equally possible that you
could lose half the amount invested; (iii) you have the opportunity to invest the full
amount, part of the amount or reject the o¤er. What share of your lottery winnings
would you be prepared to invest in this nancially risky yet lucrative investment? The
subject then ticked a box indicating if she would invest £ 100,000, £ 80,000, £ 60,000,
£ 40,000, £ 20,000, or Nothing (reject the o¤er).
The payments (both the show-up fee of £ 5 plus any payment from performance in the
randomly selected round) were in cash and were hand-delivered in sealed envelopes (clearly
labelled with each students name) to the schools a few days after the experiment. The
average payment was £ 7. In addition, immediately after completing the Exit Questionnaire,
each student was given a bag containing a soft drink, packet of crisps and bar of chocolate.
IV. Experimental Results
In this section we discuss whether the results from the ver lottery support the rst four
conjectures. We then use a series of robustness checks to see, rst, if the evidence stands
up to using di¤erent control groups and, second, if the results alter when we instrument for
single-sex schooling or use propensity score matching.
IV.A. The Sample
Table 1 shows means for each of our four subsamples school di¤erences for girls and
boys and gender di¤erences by school type. Risk attitudes and the demographic variables
were obtained from the post-experiment survey questionnaire. The goal is to have the
treatment and control groups roughly equivalent and to control for any di¤erences that may
exist. Table 1 shows that there are some di¤erences between students from coeducational
and single-sex schools. For example, girls and boys at single-sex schools were far more likely
to have both parents with a university (college) degree than their coeducational counterparts.
As discussed before, an educated parent could have an e¤ect on their childs level of risk-
aversion. Furthermore, boys at single-sex schools tend to be older than girls at single-sex
schools. For our variable of interest, whether a student choose option two in the "Fiver"
lottery, there is a gender di¤erence among coed students but not among single-sex students
and that girls from single-sex schools enter the lottery more than girls from coed schools.
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This is despite there being much di¤erence in reported levels of risk.12
[Insert Table 1 here]
IV.B. Gender Di¤erences and Nurture
The expected monetary value of the ver lottery discussed above is £ 6.50 which is greater
than the alternative choice a certain outcome of £ 5. Assuming a constant relative risk
aversion utility function of the type u(x) = x1 =(1   ), where  is the degree of relative
risk aversion, we calculate that the value of  making an individual just indi¤erent between
choosing the lottery and the certain outcome is approximately 0.53. Individuals with  >
0:53 will choose the certain outcome, while those with  < 0:53 will choose the lottery.13
In the risk preference classication used by Holt and Laury (2002: 1649), a person with
0:41 <  < 0:68 would be classied as risk averseand is within the 0.3-0.5 range which
is consistent with the estimates implied by behavior in games, auctions and other decision
tasks. Likewise, our chosen value of  is close to the mean coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
found in the empirical work by Dohmen et al. (2006). Therefore the ver lottery presented
here is consistent with existing experimental and empirical data.
To examine if there are any gender di¤erences in the choice of whether or not to enter
the ver lottery we construct an indicator variable taking the value one if the individual
choses to enter the ver lottery and zero otherwise. This becomes our dependent variable in
a simple probit model of the probability of choosing the lottery. Table 2 shows the marginal
e¤ects of those probit regressions.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Column [1] of Table 2 shows that, on average, girls choose to enter the lottery 16 per-
centage points less than boys. The sign and signicance of this coe¢ cient is consistent
with other work looking at gender and risk aversion and suggests that in our sample female
students are also more risk averse than male students. This provides evidence for conjecture
one. Now we want to investigate next if the gender di¤erences alter when environmental
factors reecting nurture are incorporated into the estimation.
The specication in Column [2] adds controls for school-type and experimental group
composition. In this specication the gender gap for girls in single-sex schooling becomes
12. In the post-experiment survey questionnaire, individuals were asked to report their risk attitudes on a
scale running from 0 to 10, with 0 labelled as "risk averse" and 10 as "fully prepared to take risks". We will
describe this in more detail in Section 4.
13. This was calculated from pu(x) + (1  p)u(y) = u(z), where p =0.5, x =11, y = 2 and z =5. We use
the specic CRRA functional form for u(:) given in the text.
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even more obvious; girls now choose to enter the lottery 36 percentage points less than coed
boys. However, girls in single-sex schools are now just as likely to enter the tournament as
boys from coed and single-sex schools. This evidence allows us to discuss conjectures two and
four. Given that the coe¢ cient on female interacted with single-sex is positive it appears that
females are beneting from single-sex education, supporting conjecture three. Furthermore,
since the marginal e¤ect for comparing a single-sex girl to a coed boy is insignicant, -0.07,
then there is no evidence that single-sex girls are any di¤erent than coed boys. We can
now examine conjectures three and more of conjecture four. Girls in all-girls groups are
12 percentage points more likely to enter the lottery than girls in mixed groups. This
means that being in an all-girls group is causing women to be less risk averse since girls
were randomly assigned to their groups. Thus there is strong evidence for conjecture three,
that girls in same-gender experimental groups are less risk averse than girls in mixed gender
experimental groups. This result is after 30 minutes of being in an all-girls group and, in
comparison to the female single-sex schooling interaction, suggests that women are not more
risk averse than men by nature. However the e¤ect from being in an all-girls group does not
cancel out the e¤ect of being female and thus it seems that girls in same gender experimental
groups do not choose to enter the tournament as much as coed boys.
Columns [1] and [2] provide strong evidence for conjectures one, two, and three and some
evidence for conjecture four. Columns [3]-[6] provide robustness checks for that evidence.
IV.C. Robustness Checks
A students attendance a single-sex school is likely to be inuenced by her ability as well
as by the choices of her parents or teachers.14 Therefore students from single-sex schools
may not be a random subset of the students from Essex. However it should be remembered
that we asked only top students from coeducational schools to participate in the experi-
ment. As a sensitivity analysis we performed three checks of the single-sex schooling and
female interaction results. First, we compared single-sex students to a di¤erent comparison
group: students from Su¤olk plus students in Essex who took the 11+ exam. Second, we
instrumented for single-sex school attendance. Finally we used propensity score matching
to examine the female, single-sex schooling interaction.
Column [3] of Table 2 uses only the sample of students from Su¤olk, those who took
the 11+ exam, and students from single-sex schools. Students in Su¤olk have to attend
there closest school so they are likely to be a more representative sample. Furthermore, if
14.As noted earlier, Essex primary-school teachers and parents choose which children sit for the Essex-
wide exam for entry into grammar schools. Parents must be resident in Essex for their children to be eligible
to sit the entrance exam (the 11+ exam).
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"parental pushiness" is an issue than those students who took the 11+ exam should look
more like the single-sex students. Using this sample, we see that the gender gap actually
gets slightly larger; girls are 48 percentage points less likely to enter the lottery. However,
the single-sex coe¢ cient is also negative and signicant. This suggests that there may be
evidence that boys in coed schools are being encouraged to take more risks and "show o¤"
for the girls, i.e. that stereotype threat could be causing the gender gap in risk aversion to
be larger. This evidence would t with the discussion of conjecture two. Girls in same-
gender groups, are again 12 percentage points less likely to enter the lottery than girls in
coed groups, still providing evidence for conjecture three. Finally with regards to conjecture
four, the marginal e¤ect for the di¤erence between a single-sex girl and a coed boy is now
signicant and negative; a single-sex girls is 8 percentage points less likely to choose the
lottery than a coed boy. By comparing single-sex students to a di¤erent control group we
nd that there is still evidence for conjectures one, two, and three but that the evidence to
support conjecture four is weaker. However, it should still be noted that girls from single-sex
schools, while not taking the lottery at the same proportion as boys, are entering the lottery
more than coed girls.
In column [4] of Table 2 we present the regression results of the linear probability model
(LPM). We do this so that we can address the potential endogeneity of the single-sex
schooling variable in another way: by instrumenting for single-sex schooling. We used
the six-digit residential postcode for each student to calculate the distances to the nearest
single-sex school and to the nearest coed school. (Our sample size shrinks slightly, as some
postcode responses were unreadable.) From this, we imputed the minimum traveling time
to the closest coeducational school and to the closest single-sex school.15 We next calculated
a variable equal to the minimum time needed to travel to the closest single-sex school minus
the minimum time to travel to the closest coeducational school. We then break this variable
into deciles creating 10 dummy variables. For example, if the di¤erence in travelling time
for a student fell in the rst decile, that student would be assigned a one for the rst dummy
variable and a zero for all others. Using these 10 variables, we instrumented for attendance
at a single-sex school using a two-step process. First, we estimated the probability of a
student attending a single-sex school, where the explanatory variables were an Essex dummy
(taking the value one if the student resides in Essex and zero otherwise) and an interaction
15.To calculate this, we used the postcode of each school and the postcode in which a stu-
dent resides. We then entered the students postcode in the start category in MapQuest.co.uk
(http://www.mapquest.co.uk/mq/directions/mapbydirection.do) and the schools postcode in the ending
address.Mapquest then gave us a total estimated. time for driving from one location to the other. It
is this value that we used. Thus the average time is based on the speed limit of roads and the roads
classication (i.e. as a motorway or route).
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of Essex-resident with the 10 travelling-time variables. We then estimated the regression
reported in column [5], which is a LPM, where we use predicted single-sex school attendance
in place of the original single-sex school dummy. Since the equation uses predicted values,
we bootstrapped the standard errors for attending a single-sex school.16 Even here we nd
that the female, single-sex schooling interaction and all-girls group variable are statistically
signicant.
Given that there were some di¤erences between our samples in Table 1. We used all
controls that were di¤erent at the 5% level in our summary statistics and added them as
controls in column [6] of Table 2. The controls used were whether a students mother had
a university degree, whether a students father had a university degree, whether a student
was the eldest child, and whether the student was aged 14 years. Furthermore we allowed
these factors to e¤ect a students risk aversion di¤erently by gender and schooling type so we
interacted the controls by female, single-sex schooling, and their interaction. The regression
results in column [6] again provide strong evidence for conjectures one, two, three and parts
of conjecture four.
Finally, since the distance to ones school may not be exogeneous to the choice of where
to go to school and perhaps ones risk attitudes we also use propensity score matching to
examine the e¤ect of the female, single-sex schooling interaction. The results are presented
in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3]
The estimations in Table 3 are calculated using all pretreatment characteristics. We use
the number of sinblings a student has, the number of female siblings, the education level of
the mother and father, the mother and fathers employment status when the student was
aged 14, and naly the industry in which the students mother or father was employed when
the student was 14 years old. Based on those charateristics we estimate the propensity score
presented in Table 3. The point estimates are all signicant at the 1% level and are roughly
the same as the female, single-sex interaction point estimate in column [6] of Table 2.
Given these there robustness checks and the continued signicance of the single-sex,
female interaction and the all-girls group variable, there seems to be strong evidence for
conjectures two and three, that single-sex girls enter the lottery more than coed girls and
that girls in same-gender groups enter the lottery more than girls in mixed gender groups.
However, the evidence for conjecture four is mixed. There is some evidence that girls from
single-sex schools enter the lottery as much as boys from coed and single-sex school but the
16.We randomly drew 1,000 di¤erent samples from our experimental data to calculate the bootstrap
results.
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robustness of that estimate does not hold in all specications in Table 2. Furthermore, the
girls in same-gender groups are not entering the tournament as much as coed boys. Despite
the lack of rm support for conjecture four, the evidence does show that girls in single-sex
and coed groups are entering the tournament more than girls from coed schools. This
provides strong evidence that nurture is e¤ecting the risk attitudes of girls. We now want
to examine if this evidence is able to be derived using commonly asked survey questions.
V. Survey Versus Experimental Results
The experimental setting provided evidence that nurturing a¤ects at least a girls behav-
iour under uncertainty. We now examine whether survey questions could have been used
to obtain those results and if the answers to commonly used survey questions provide any
predictive power in explaining how a subject behaves in an experimental setting. To see if
a students answer to the general risk question, outlined in detail in Section 4, provided any
insight into whether the student would enter the "ver" lottery we reran that probit regres-
sion with an additional control for general risk attitude. The marginal e¤ects are reported
in column [2] of Table 4. The results show that choosing the "ver" lottery is positively
correlated with how prepared a student is to take risks. But inclusion of risk attitudes does
not take away the explanatory power of the single-sex, female interaction or of the all-girls
group coe¢ cient.17 Furthermore, the interaction of responses to the general risk question
with being female is statistically insignicant. If student responses to the general risk atti-
tudes question pick up their unobserved propensity to overstate their risk-loving, then the
insignicance of this interaction implies that neither sex overstates more than the other.
Likewise, when we use the students answer to the hypothetical lottery see column [3] of
Table 4 the explanatory power of the single-sex female interaction and being in all-girls
group coe¢ cient remain statistically signicant even though some of the coe¢ cienta to the
survey response are also statistically signicant. However there is little di¤erence in how
boys and girls responded the survey question as the hypothetical amount interacted with
being female has little explanatory value. This again suggests that the survey questions are
being answered in a similar way by both boys and girls.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Since the general risk question and the answer to the hypothetical lottery are positively
correlated with choosing to enter the ver lottery, we will now examine if the answers to
17.This result is robust to entering a dummy variable for each option, i.e. 0-10, or for entering a squared
term for the general risk question.
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the two survey questions could have been used as dependent variables instead of the real
stakes experimental outcome. Columm [4] of Table 4 uses the responses to the general risk
question as the dependent variable. In this case the regression model used is OLS. Notice
that all of the variables of interest are now statistically insignicant. There is no gender
e¤ect (the female dummy is not signicant); there is no school-level nurturing (the single-sex
and female interaction is insignicant); and there is no e¤ect of the experimental peer-group.
Even if a binary variable is created from the general risk attitudes question using any cut
point ranging from 3 to 8 the survey question does not yield the same results as the real
stakes experimental lottery.
Columns [5]-[7] of Table 4 use the responses to the hypothetical risky investment as the
dependent variable. As noted earlier, this not only represents a risky investment decision,
as distinct from the abstract gamble for real stakes represented by the ver lottery, but it
also involves hypothetical amounts. Column [5] reports the results from OLS estimation.
Notice that the female dummy has a statistically insignicant e¤ect but that the interaction
of female with single-sex schooling is statistically signicant at the 5% level. In column
[6] a tobit model is used (because a student can choose to put none of her hypothetical
lottery winnings in the risky investment). Again, only the single-sex school and female
interaction is signicant at the 5% level. Finally, in column [7] an ordered probit model is
used and again only the single-sex and female result is signicant (5% level). This suggests
that, while the hypothetical lottery investment does not provide the same evidence about
relative risk-aversion as the real stakes experimental lottery, nonetheless the interaction of
female with single-sex schooling remains statistically signicant across the three estimation
methods. Using the survey question would suggest there is not gender di¤erence in risk
aversion but that women attending single-sex schools are not only as likely as men to enter
the real-stakes gamble, but they also invest more in the hypothetical risky investment than
do coed women and all men.
Given the results in Table 4, it seems that there is mixed evidence for the fth conjec-
ture. While the commonly used general risk attitude question is positively correlated with
actual risky choices made under uncertainty, the determinants of these general risk atti-
tudes di¤er quite markedly from the determinants of actual risky choices under uncertainty.
This suggests that relying only on general risk attitudes might lead researchers to make
misleading inferences about gender di¤erences in choice under uncertainty. In contrast, the
determinants of the amounts invested from the hypothetical lottery had some similarities to
the determinants of actual risky choices under uncertainty. Estimating the determinants of
amounts invested from the hypothetical lottery yielded the insight that girls attending single
sex schools invest more in the risky outcome than boys. The real-stakes experimental lottery
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showed that girls from single-sex school were as likely as boys to enter the lottery, which
is not inconsistent with the hypothetical lottery results. Finally, the gender gap in risk
aversion that is present in much of the experimental literature is not present in the survey
questions. This example illustrates the complementary roles of experimental and survey
data.
VI. Conclusion
Women and men may di¤er in their propensity to choose a risky outcome because of
innate preferences or because pressure to conform to gender-stereotypes encourages girls
and boys to modify their innate preferences. Single-sex environments are likely to modify
studentsrisk-taking preferences in economically important ways. To test this, we designed a
controlled experiment in which subjects were given an opportunity to choose a risky outcome
a real-stakes gamble with a higher expected monetary value than the alternative outcome
with a certain payo¤and in which the sensitivity of observed risk choices to environmental
factors could be explored. The results of our real-stakes gamble show that gender di¤erences
in preferences for risk-taking are indeed sensitive to whether the girl attends a single-sex or
coed school. Girls from single-sex schools are as likely to choose the real-stakes gamble as
boys from either coed or single sex schools, and more likely than coed girls. Moreover, we
found that gender di¤erences in preferences for risk-taking are sensitive to the gender mix of
the experimental group, with girls being more likely to choose risky outcomes when assigned
to all-girl groups.
We also found that gender di¤erences in risk aversion are sensitive to the method of
eliciting preferences. While the commonly used general risk attitude question is positively
correlated with actual risky choices made under uncertainty, the determinants of these gen-
eral risk attitudes di¤er quite markedly from the determinants of actual risky choices under
uncertainty. This suggests that relying only on survey-based general risk attitudes might lead
researchers to make misleading inferences about gender di¤erences in choice under uncer-
tainty. In contrast, the determinants of the amounts invested from the hypothetical lottery
had some similarities to the determinants of actual real-stakes gambles under uncertainty.
To summarize our main results, we have discovered at least one setting in addition to
the Kasai tribe of India studied by Gneezy, Leonard and List (2008) in which it is untrue
that the average female avoids risky behaviour more than the average male. On average girls
from single-sex schools are found in our experiment to be as likely as boys to choose the risky
behaviour. This suggests that observed gender di¤erences in behaviour under uncertainty
found in previous studies might reect social learning rather than inherent gender traits, a
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nding that would be hard, if not impossible, to show using survey-based evidence alone.
While our research should not be interpreted as saying that we should all immediately
enrol our daughters in single-sex schools, it does provide food for thought. It seems appropri-
ate to conclude with the following quotation from the classic work by educational sociologists
Kessler et al. (1985: 44): "Particular kinds of behavior, particular ways of being, are cultur-
ally dominant.... We have come to refer to the dominant patterns as hegemonic masculinity
and emphasised femininity....What is hegemonic at any given time depends on how the re-
lations among di¤erent kinds of masculinity and femininity have been worked out. That
negotiation is one of the key roles of the school."
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VII. Appendix A: The Experiment
In the experiment, students were escorted into a large auditorium. One individual read
o¤ the instructions at the same time to everyone who was participating. All the graduate
supervisors hired to supervise groups were given a copy of the instructions, were involved
in the pilot that had taken place, and had gone through comprehensive training. These
supervisors answered questions if they were raised.
Below are the text of the slides that were shown to the students when they arrived at
the auditorium:
Slide 1:
Welcome to the University of Essex!
Today you are going to be taking part in an economics experiment.
Treat this as if it were an exam situation:
No talking to your neighbours.
Raise your hand if you have any questions.
There will be no deception in this experiment.
Slide 2:
The experiment today will involve completing 3 rounds of mazes.
Rules for completing a maze:
Get from the ag on the left hand side to the ag on the right hand side.
Do not cross any lines!
Do not go outside of the box.
We will now go through an example!!
Comment:
At this point students were shown one practice maze and were walked through how to
solve it, illustrating the three points raised above.
Slide 3:
The supervisors in your row will be handing you maze packets throughout the session.
At all times you need to put your seat letter and number on the packet and your name.
Please make sure you know your row letter and seat number.
Your seat is also on your badge. It is the middle grouping. For example, if you badge
was 1-A3-F your seat number should be A3. Make sure this is correct now.
Mazes: You should do the mazes in order.
If you cannot solve a maze put an X through it and go onto the next maze.
If you do not put an X through it none of the following mazes will be marked.
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Note: If you do not have the correct seat number on your maze packets you may be paid
incorrectly.
Slide 4:
We are going to be doing six rounds of mazes.
Before each round of mazes we will explain how you will be paid for that round.
After all six rounds of mazes are nished we will choose one round to "implement".
That means you will get paid for your performance in that round.
The round for which you will be paid will be chosen randomly from this cup.
You will also receive GBP 5 for showing up today.
Since you do not know for which round you will be getting paid, you should do your best
in each round and treat each round separately.
Slide 5:
You will get 5 minutes to solve up to 15 mazes.
Please solve as many mazes as you can.
Do not begin until I say go!
For this round you will get npounds 0.50 for each maze you solve correctly:
Example: If you solve 8 mazes correctly you will earn GBP 4.
Please make sure you have put your name and seat on the maze packet now.
Are there any questions?
OK > GO!
OK > STOP
No Talking!
Slide 6:
Now you will get npounds 2 for each maze you solve correctly IF you solve the most
mazes correctly in your group.
Your group consists of you and the 3 other people sitting in your ntextquotedblleft
rowntextquotedblright who have the same rst number on their badge.
Example: If your badge number is 1-B2-M then your group consists of you and the three
other students with the badges 1-**-* in your row.
If you are in group 1 and you solve 8 mazes correctly then:
IF everyone else in your group solved fewer than 8 mazes correctly you will get GBP
16.
IF someone in your group solved 9 mazes correctly, you would get GBP 0.
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Note: Ties will be broken randomly. Thus IF two people in your group solve 8 mazes
correctly we ip a coin to see who gets the GBP 16.
Are there any questions?
Slide 7:
You will get 5 minutes to solve up to 15 mazes.
Please solve as many mazes as you can
Please make sure you have put your name and seat on the maze packet now.
Do not begin until I say go!
OK > GO!
OK > STOP
No Talking!
Slide 8:
In this round you choose between two options.
Option 1: Get GBP 0.50 per maze you solve correctly.
Option 2: Get GBP 2 per maze you solve correctly IF you solve more mazes correctly
than the other three people in your group did LAST round.
Example: Say you solve 8 mazes correctly this round.
If you chose option 1 you get GBP 4.
If you chose option 2:
You get GBP 16 IF the other three people in your group solved fewer than 8
mazes correctly in Round 2.
You get GBP 0 IF one other person solved 9 mazes correctly in Round 2.
Note: Ties will be broken randomly. Thus IF one person in your group solved
8 mazes correctly in round 2 we ip
a coin to see if you get the GBP 16.
Are there any questions?
Slide 9:
A supervisor will now come by and give you a card for you to circle option 1 or option 2.
Option 1: Get GBP 0.50 per maze you solve correctly.
Option 2: Get GBP 2 per maze you solve correctly IF you solve more mazes correctly
than the other three people in your group did LAST round.
Circle your choice, fold the paper and give it back to the supervisor.
You need to write your seat number on the piece of paper
Do not tell anyone your choice!
23
You will get 5 minutes to solve up to 15 mazes.
Please solve as many mazes as you can
Do not begin until I say go!
Please make sure you have put your name and seat on the maze packet now.
Do not begin until I say go!
OK > GO!
OK > STOP
No Talking!
Slide 10:
In this round you will not have to do any mazes.
Everyone will be given £ 5 to play with. Think of the £ 5 as already being your own
money.
You now face a choice:
Option One: Keep your £ 5.
Option Two: Gamble with your £ 5.
IF you choose option two you will ip a coin at the end of this round.
IF the coin comes up heads you will get £ 11.
IF the coin comes up tails you will get £ 2.
A supervisor will now hand you a piece of paper. Choose Option One or Option Two
and then fold the paper.
Please put your seat number on the option card
Do not tell anyone your choice!
Everyone will now stand up when the supervisor comes to you and Flip a coin. Your
supervisor will record the ip.
Slide 11:
Thank you for completing the mazes!
Your last set of mazes will now be collected please stay seated.
I will now pull the number from the hat..... AND!?
You will be handed a survey Read the questions very carefully and make sure you
respond to ALL the questions including the ones at the very end.
After everyone is done completing the survey a supervisor will hand you some refresh-
ments.
Make sure you put your seat on the survey!
Then after 10-15 minutes, your supervisor will give you an envelope with your money
and ask you to sign a piece of paper. Then you will go to your bus.
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Please keep your winnings condential.
THANKS!
Comment:
Due to the time it took to ll all the envelopes with money, subjects ended up recieving
the money two days later as the students needed to get back to their schools to be picked
up by their parents.
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VARIABLES Coed SS Dif Coed SS Dif Girls Boys Dif Girls Boys Dif
Option Two in "Fiver" Round (=1) 0.54 0.86 0.32*** 0.88 0.78 ‐0.10 0.86 0.78 0.08 0.54 0.88 ‐0.34***
[0.05] [0.07] [0.05] [0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.08] [0.06]
Number of Siblings 1.67 1.59 ‐0.08 1.69 1.28 ‐0.41* 1.59 1.28 0.31 1.66 1.69 ‐0.03
[0.11] [0.17] [0.15] [0.22] [0.19] [0.15] [0.19] [0.16]
Number of Female Siblings 0.80 0.57 ‐0.23* 0.87 0.68 ‐0.19 0.57 0.67 ‐0.10 0.81 0.87 ‐0.06
[0.08] [0.12] [0.13] [0.19] [0.15] [0.11] [0.15] [0.12]
Birth Order 1.73 1.78 0.05 1.86 1.46 ‐0.40** 1.78 1.47 0.31* 1.72 1.86 ‐0.14
[0.09] [0.15] [0.12] [0.17] [0.16] [0.12] [0.17] [0.13]
Age 14.80 14.95 0.15 14.81 14.48 ‐0.33** 14.95 14.48 0.47*** 14.8 14.81 ‐0.01
[0.06] [0.10] [0.09] [0.13] [0.12] [0.09] [0.11] [0.09]
Mother went to University 0.12 0.48 0.36*** 0.15 0.43 0.28*** 0.48 0.43 0.05 0.12 0.15 ‐0.03
[0.04] [0.07] [0.06] [0.09] [0.10] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05]
Father went to University 0.16 0.52 0.36*** 0.27 0.54 0.27*** 0.51 0.54 ‐0.03 0.16 0.27 ‐0.11*
[0.04] [0.07] [0.07] [0.10] [0.10] [0.07] [0.07] [0.05]
Min travel nearest coed school 13.45 24.23 10.78*** 14.59 27.63 13.04*** 24.23 27.63 ‐3.40* 13.45 14.59 ‐1.14
[1.04] [1.64] [1.48] [2.21] [2.02] [1.55] [1.64] [1.32]
Min travel nearest single‐sex school 24.18 15.32 ‐8.86*** 24.53 12.95 ‐11.58*** 15.32 12.95 2.37 24.18 24.53 ‐0.35
[0.80] [1.24] [1.29] [1.91] [1.69] [1.30] [1.06] [0.85]
Average risk score ( Scale =  1‐10) 6.40 6.95 0.55* 6.90 6.69 ‐0.21 6.95 6.69 0.26 6.4 6.90 ‐0.50
[0.18] [0.29] [0.93] [1.38] [0.38] [0.29] [0.30] [0.24]
OBSERVATIONS 96 66 52 46 66 46 96 52
Table 1: Sample proportions and averages by gender and school‐background
GIRLS BOYS SINGLE‐SEX COED
COEFFICIENT [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Female (=1) ‐0.16*** ‐0.36*** ‐0.48*** ‐0.43*** ‐0.46*** ‐0.34***
[0.05] [0.07] [0.09] [0.08] [0.09] [0.11]
Single‐Sex (=1) ‐0.13 ‐0.28** ‐0.10 ‐0.11 ‐0.06
[0.10] [0.11] [0.08] [0.09] [0.18]
Female * Single‐Sex 0.33*** 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.47*** 0.30**
[0.06] [0.07] [0.10] [0.13] [0.12]
All‐Girls Group (=1) 0.12* 0.12* 0.13* 0.14* 0.14**
[0.06] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08] [0.06]
All‐Boys Group (=1) ‐0.05 ‐0.03 ‐0.04 ‐0.00 ‐0.05
[0.10] [0.11] [0.08] [0.08] [0.11]
‐0.07 ‐0.08* ‐0.04
[0.05] [0.04] [0.06]
Controls No No No No No Yes
Controls * Female No No No No No Yes
Controls * Single‐Sex No No No No No Yes
Controls * Female * Single‐Sex No No No No No Yes
Model Type Probit Probit Probit LPM IV LPM Probit
Constant 0.90*** 0.90***
[0.05] [0.06]
Observations 260 260 201 260 243 260
R‐squared 0.131 0.115
F‐Stat for IV Variables 155.6
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2: Dependant variable (=1) if student choose option two in "Fiver Round"
Columns [1], [2], [4], [5], and [6] use the entire sample.  Column [3] uses only students from Suffolk, those who took the 
11+ exam, and single‐sex students.  Controls that are used are: Mother went to University (=1); Father went to University 
(=1); Eldest Child (=1); Aged 14 years (=1).  Standard errors for Single‐Sex and Female * Single‐Sex are estimated using a 
bootstrap in column [5].  Marginal Effects are reported when model is probit.
Marginal Effect for Female + Single‐
Sex + Female *  Single‐Sex
Female * Single‐Sex (=1) 0.28** 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.24***
[0.11] [0.10] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08]
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242
Using nearest (#) of neighbors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Standard errors are calculated by bootstrap
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Propensity Score Estimate for the female, single‐sex education interaction.
VARIABLES
Readiness 
to take Risk 
(1‐10)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Female (=1) ‐0.36*** ‐0.51*** ‐0.33*** ‐0.44 ‐0.79 ‐0.92 ‐0.29
[0.07] [0.13] [0.08] [0.37] [0.58] [0.75] [0.23]
Single‐Sex (=1) ‐0.13 ‐0.12 ‐0.13 ‐0.21 ‐0.34 ‐0.31 ‐0.11
[0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.40] [0.56] [0.71] [0.22]
Female * Single‐Sex 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.28*** 0.75 1.83** 2.25** 0.70***
[0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.50] [0.71] [0.89] [0.27]
All‐Girls Group (=1) 0.12* 0.13** 0.12** ‐0.18 0.25 0.29 0.09
[0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.29] [0.43] [0.55] [0.16]
All‐Boys Group (=1) ‐0.05 ‐0.06 ‐0.04 ‐0.12 1.00 1.24* 0.38*
[0.10] [0.11] [0.10] [0.42] [0.61] [0.75] [0.23]
Readiness to take Risk ( 0.04*
[0.02]
Female * Readiness to t 0.04
[0.03]
Invest £20,000 (=1) ‐0.07
[0.14]
Invest £40,000 (=1) 0.06
[0.11]
Invest £60,000 (=1) 0.04
[0.12]
Invest £80,000 (=1) 0.34***
[0.04]
Invest £100,000 (=1) ‐0.14
[0.28]
Female * Invest £20,00 0.05
[0.13]
Female * Invest £40,00 ‐0.13
[0.18]
Female * Invest £60,00 0.16**
[0.08]
Female * Invest £80,00 ‐0.88***
[0.02]
Female * Invest £100,0 0.13
[0.12]
MODEL TYPE Probit Probit Probit OLS OLS Tobit rdered Probit
Constant 6.94*** 3.41*** 2.87***
[0.27] [0.45] [0.59]
Observations 260 255 259 255 259 259 259
R‐squared 0.019 0.058
Cut 1 ‐0.72***
[0.18]
Cut 2 ‐0.05
[0.18]
Cut 3 0.64***
[0.18]
Cut 4 1.22***
[0.20]
Cut 5 1.90***
Robust standard errors in brackets [0.22]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(=1) if Student Choose Option 
Two in "Fiver" round
Hypothetical Lottery Investment
Table 4: Examining the Experimental and Survey Results Together.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
